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John R. Bullock

COMES NOW John R. Bullock, defendant/appellant

alone named,

in reply to the Response of Toyota of Ogden, plaintiff/appel1ee,
to the Brief filed in this appeal.
As to the pertinent parts in particular:

JURISDICTION

TOYOTA challenges the Court's jurisdiction in the appeal at
Bar.

BULLOCK advocates that the hearing, review, and judgement of

this Court - for reasons of judicial efficiency and economy - are
presently appropr iate.
The doctrine of res judicata has two related but distinct
branches.

Both branches, however, have the dual purpose of

protecting

litigants from relitigating an identical

of promoting

issue and

judicial economy by preventing needless

litigation.

(See DeBry v. Fidelity 828 P.2d 520, Kemp v. Murray 680 P.2d 758,
and Saunders v. Sharp 818 P.2d 574.)

The concern for flexibility,

judicial economy, and the preservation of substantial
preventing redundant

litigation seem apparent

TOYOTA's position that this Court

rights by

in this appeal.

lacks jurisdicition is

premised on the contention that BULLOCK's change to the Docketing
Statement was beyond timeliness constraints.

The determination by

this Court that it has jurisdiction would in no way abridge any of
the substantial

rights of the appellee, whereas a dismissal would

involve significant

redundancy to bring this matter to this point

again.
In the event the Court determines to dismiss this appeal, the
Court's appropriate comments on BULLOCK's contentions as basis for
this appeal would serve judicial efficiency in that such contentions
will arise again at the trial court

level.

APPELLANT

IS ENTITLED TO REVERSAL OR NEW TRIAL

TOYOTA maintains that BULLOCK's claim of ineffective counsel
should be denied because 1) it cannot be raised for the first
on appeal, and 2) this was a contempt
constitutional

time

hearing in a civil case and a

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not

apply.
In State v. Humphries, 818 2.Pd 1027, this Court determined that
judicial economy may be served in peculiar, narrow

circumstances

including ineffectiveness of counsel as a new issue on appeal.

The

original meritless basis used by BULLOCK's counsel for the filing of
the appeal at Bar and the subsequent withdrawl of BULLOCK's

counsel

six months after filing this appeal for reasons of disbarment, in
conjunction with a lack of diligence supported by the record and
fully noted in BULLOCK's Brief seem to meet such peculiar, narrow
ci rcumstances.
As noted in BULLOCK's Brief, the Order to Show Cause and the
contempt proceeding - though ancillary to a civil case - was a criminal
contempt proceeding and in State v. Lush, 95 N.W.2d 695 at [4] "...
we have often said that a prosecution for criminal contempt
by, and to be conducted

is governed

in accordance with, the strict rules applicable

in criminal prosecutions."

Presumably such should include the

constitutional guarantee of effective counsel.
TOYOTA further maintains, beyond these two bases for dismissal,
that BULLOCK has failed to meet the burden of showing that counsel
was ineffective and that had his counsel done the things BULLOCK
claims should have been done, the result would have been different.
TOYOTA presents in its response to the Brief in the statement
of facts the full transcription of the ten messages left on the

answering machine of Mr, Tony Divino between 5:10 p.m. and 10:37 p.m.
on Saturday, June 27, 1992.

BULLOCK's drunken spree in essence

amounts to his talking to himself for a total period of less than five
minutes.

Though BULLOCK is contrite with regard to the language used

in these messages, BULLOCK does proffer that had his evidence of
mitigating circumstances been allowed by the trial

judge this

language

would appear mild and tame as compared to that used to provoke BULLOCK.
TOYOTA also maintains at point 13. pg 10 of its Response that
the trial court heard testimony and concluded that TOYOTA's

"goading"

or provocation would not have occurred had BULLOCK not made the
initial call to TOYOTA's place of business.

Because the trial court

sustained TOYOTA f s objection to the presentation of testimony and
evidence regarding mitigating circumstances, such was never fully
presented to the court.

The judge's opinion that the provocation

would not have occurred without BULLOCK's first calling TOYOTA's
place of business

lacked adequate basis in its finding of fact.

Though BULLOCK has maintained, as noted by TOYOTA, that his counsel
was persistent

at the trial on this single issue, it should be noted

that BULLOCK's counsel, through an apparent

lack of diligence, did

not follow up and use this as basis in the original filing of this
appeal.
With regard to the trial court's jurisdicition TOYOTA maintains
on page 20 of its Response that, "Even if counsel had objected

[to the

presentation of an amended constable's return], it is apparent

the

result would have been the same."

Such objection may have resulted

in an evidentiary hearing that would have allowed counsel a reasonable
time for preparation of BULLOCK's case, such extension having been
denied by the trial court

judge.

With proper preparation, the outcome

of this case may have determined that the ten calls placed to the

answering machine of Tony Divino were a single violation of the
trial court's order enjoining Bullock from responding to TOYOTA's
provocations.

The outcome may have been significantly different.

As to the reasonableness of attorney's fees awarded, TOYOTA has
chosen not to address the prima facie case of the trial judge lacking
adequate fact or the argument of excessive burden in hours presented
in BULLOCK's brief on pages 20, 21 and 22 except to essentially say
because counsel presented them the fees were reasonable.
The 'clearly erroneous" standard of Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d
1162, appears to be present in this appeal.

CONCLUSION
As to TOYOTA's request to be awarded costs and attorney's fees
in defending this appeal, BULLOCK respectfully submits that this
appeal has merit and is not frivolous.

As such TOYOTA has no claim

by contract or in law for the awarding of attorney's fees.
BULLOCK humbly requests this Court to allow the hearing of this
appeal and grant the relief requested by appellant.
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day of February, 1994.
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